A Victimological Approach to Causes of War

Table of Contents:

Victimological research has found aggression to be "attracted" and escalated by forms of inferior traits, behaviour and status.

At the level of nations, we found their pendants to be long-term external unsuccessfulness (U-state) and long-term internal discord (D-state); these strongly interrelate and add up to the state of victimological predisposition (VP-state). This suggests to employ the latter as an indicator in a heuristic approach to causes of war.

An analysis of the few decades respectively preceding 17 major wars shows that each of the wars followed a distinct VP-state of the final loser. Generally interpreted, the latter prepares the soil for either of the main forms of fatal collective victimization : Those by war and/or by famine. Both mainly affect the respective lower social strata.

Like any approach mainly based on empirical case studies in history, this investigation cannot predict the degree of deterrence or "braking" -- versus a major war -- by ABC arms. Owing to the high threshold, latent crises in the recent decades didn't escalate beyond conventional wars in "third-world" countries.

Some explanatory details and arguments were omitted in this description. (A more comprehensive version of the text and of empirical confirmation by Table 3 can be obtained from the first author.)

A summary of these should be stated proceeding from results proven in interpersonal victimology. In order to cover both sides of the social spectrum, we introduce two categories: The victimologically predisposed, named VP; and the victimologically "immune", named VI (cf. Table 1).

The VP category bears traits which are forms of poor frustration tolerance/low stress resistance, which again result in long-term unsuccessfulness. According to Schuh [1], the typical victim even bears criminogenic inclinations.

The VI category possesses great frustration tolerance and stress resistance, proven e.g. by forms like high self-control, patience and/or "disarming" charme whenever adequate, which result in long-term success.

The VP traits described above engender antipathy and make victimization latent; the nature of this predisposition can be summarized thus:

1. By subconscious, "unintended" mistakes made in (re)action, the victim provokes -- and/or "agrees" to -- victimization. [2]
   "Accidental" self-injury, or self-destruction by any addiction also suggest a high share of the subconscious in becoming a victim : Self-victimization indirectly contributes to victimization by others.
   
   
2. There is also a significant overlap in the population of victims and direct victimizers; and both are mostly of low social strata (especially in fatal victimization). [3,4]
   
   
3. As their traits hardly alter, VP repeatedly become victims: The recidivous victim is thus the pendant to the recidivist criminal. [5]
   

At the national level, the efficacy of victimological principles is expanded and modified by the following details:

• Like an individual, but different in quality, a nation represents an open system: Selectively open de facto for border-crossing valuable information, persons and goods to "migrate" mainly from unsuccessful and discordial nations to such in a VI-state. This means that the state of a nation may alter or amplify within decades or centuries. Hence we shall not describe e.g. "VP-nations", but nations in a VP-state.
  
  
• Each nation holds higher and lower social strata. While losing in an (interpersonal) armed duel may terminate the victim's life, a nation at war or famine (cf. Figure 2) would lose a part mainly of its lower social strata, but survive as a nation.
  
  
• Formal jurisdiction (in a constitutional state) treats the "successful" individual offender as the (criminal) defendant. Under the different pattern of power and law at international level, the factual treatment there clearly deviates: Since the causes and results of a war or intervention were hardly ever subjected to judgement by a virtually neutral court, the losing nation was simply blamed -- and forced to pay -- for it. Hence the loser is victimized in more than one respect -- irrespective of "guilt" and with hardly a chance of "legal appeal".

Yet these peculiarities rather amplify the efficacy of victimological principles at (inter)national level:

These principles can be summarized in a modified analogy with 1., 2., and 3. above:

1. Internal discord of a nation (analogous to latent self-destruction) may escalate to civil war, which often "attracts" foreign intervention.
   
   
2. A distinct overlap of victims and direct victimizers exists e.g. on both sides of the battlefront:
   Front-line soldiers represent a disproportionately high share of the VP category. (Ancient battle patterns already favoured the front position of the lower social classes -- symbolized e.g. by the initial position of chessmen).
   
   
3. Repeated victimization of VP is also verified in history: Table 2 presents 17 series of wars respectively lost by the same nation. The (mathematical) probability for the lengths of these series to occur by random equals .06; hence revictimization at international level is significant. Yet this connection means an only partial answer as to the causes of war; it does not account for the remaining questions: Which situation precedes the respective first war of a series, and the residual 30% not occurring within a series ?

• Their efficiency is enhanced by their mutual interrelation (Figures 1a,b).
  
• Both "provoke" potentially hostile countries to exult at these failures; and this psychological effect would amplify the D- and the U-state.
  
• The close relationship of economic insufficiency (as a form of the U-state) with despotism (as a D-state form) is obvious from their present global distribution: 90% of the wealthy nations are in a state of democratic liberality; while 85% of the nations at long term material poverty are more or less stricken with long term dictatorship and/or intolerance up to civil war.
  
  This connection also holds true if we use time as a parameter: While the Nazis polled 3% of German votes in 1928, they got 33% in 1932, when the jobless rate had climbed to 32%, and industrial production had dropped to 60% of that in 1928.
  
  
  
  
  Figure 1a:  Interrelation of the two main forms of the VP-state,
  both exchangeable as cause and effect.
  
  
  
  
  Figure 1b:  Mean values of internal solidarity and external success
  on an arbitrary scale 0...6 (30 European countries;
  some points coincide); r=.72, p<.00001.
  
  
  

  For a formal proof of the connection, we estimated the data of the variable s₁ (external success) and s₂ (internal solidarity) on an arbitrary scale 0...6 each, by a uniform score of criteria. With n = 30 and r = .72, the correlation is very highly significant. The VI-state prevails at upper right; a relative VP-state at lower left.

  A simplified abstract of the recent decade under this aspect shows this:
  

  In western Europe, economic and political success interrelates with increased liberality and solidarity up to the trend for unification (EC, Germany) -- according to the interrelation s₁<-->s₂ as a pendant to Figure 1a.
  

  In eastern Europe, dictatorship -- now partly substituted by riots, secessions (USSR, Yugoslavia, Romania) and dissolution of pact system -- interrelates with (economic/political) unsuccessfulness. These D-/U-states are not yet very distinct as compared to those in some "third-world" countries.

  
  
  

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  3. The most frequent subforms of D- and U-state

  The D and U cases constituting a D-/U-state in general occur more or less alternately.
  
  • D cases may take on these forms:
    
    • Mutual accusations about the fault for common failures; grave discord between fractions of people, ranging from unbridgeable dissent on issues of belief, ideology or policy up to civil war.
      
    • Intranational violence: Troops fighting against "own" civilian population.
      
    • Dictatorship implies -- and its "maintenance" bases on -- grave discord and intolerance among the ruled. If dictatorship ceases for whatever reason, forms of discord become manifest (e.g. in riots).
      
    • High unemployment rate (often directly resulting from U cases), pronounced generations dissents etc.
      
    • All degrees of treason.
    
    
  • U cases may take on these forms:
    
    • "Defeat" in foreign policy ; considerable loss in international prestige.
      
    • Lost local conflict or war; resulting unfavourable political position.
      
    • Decline in economic and/or technical level; high and/or growing foreign debts.
      
    • Any significant national goal announced but not attained.
      
    • Relative U case: Sometimes the sole "absence" of success (as compared to nations very successful in the same era) is sufficiently distinct to appear as a U case.
      
    
    
  • Secession manifests both a D and a U case.
    
  
  
  

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  4. VP-state as a war precursor

  Any group or political party can terminate its eventual VP-state by winding-up; a nation cannot -- due to its more stable "boundary conditions".

  Recorded history (especially of antiquity) can be an incomplete mosaic of the continuum of events; and only in rare phases it would explicitely reveal D or U cases. Some of the important D and U cases (in Table 3) were accordingly derived indirectly.

  Strongly different degrees of victimization obviously account for correspondingly different degrees of the preceding VP state: For instance, losing war was much less tragical to Persia in the Persian Wars than it was for Carthage in the Punic Wars.

  "Tensions" or acute international crises were neglected in this study since they can release war only after a VP-state. Moreover, their data don't relate to the outcome of a war.

  
  

  Denotation of war:	from ... till:	loser(s):	VP-state of loser(s): (relevant cases)
  			from ... till:	D	U
  7 major ancient wars:
  1st Minor Asian War	-1521 ... -1513	Minor Asia Alliance	-1539 ... -1521		4
  2nd Minor Asian War	-1481 ... -1460	Minor Asia Alliance	-1513 ... -1490	1	1
  Great Mesopotamian War	-1111 ... -1090	Mesopot. Alliance	-1121 ... -1111		3
  Persian Wars	-490 ... -448	Persia	-500 ... -492	1	2
  1st Punic War	-264 ... -241	Carthage	-308 ... -264	2	3
  2nd Punic War	-218 ... -201	Carthage	-241 ... -218	2	3
  3rd Punic War	-149 ... -146	Carthage	-201 ... -149		3
  10 major wars in Europe / Minor Asia since 1300:
  Hundred Years' War	1337 ... 1453	England	1314 ... 1337		5
  Thirty Years' War	1618 ... 1648	Reich	1596 ... 1618	7	3
  Great Nordic War	1700 ... 1718	Sweden	1660 ... 1700	1	7
  Spanish Succession War	1701 ... 1714	France	1685 ... 1701	2	3
  Silesian Wars	1740 ... 1763	Austria	1713 ... 1740		5
  Revolution. & Napol. Wars	1792 ... 1815	France	1759 ... 1792	1	5
  German-French War	1870 ... 1871	France	1860 ... 1870		4
  Russian-Japanese War	1904 ... 1905	Russia	1878 ... 1904	1	3
  World War I	1914 ... 1918	Reich	1903 ... 1914	2	7
  World War II	1939 ... 1945	Reich	1919 ... 1939	5	1

  
  Table 3:  Summary of case studies of 17 major wars:
  Duration of VP-state and number of D/U cases
  (of the final loser) which preceded the respective war.
  
  
  

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  5. Interpretation of results

  The causal connection of the VP-state to war proves highly significant in Table 3; it can be summarized and interpreted in detail as follows:
  

  1. Nations which underwent a VP-state were losers of the war which eventually followed. In few cases, only U cases were manifest, or D cases prevailed.
     
  2. Nations which succeeded in keeping neutral, and such which won the war, had been in a VI-state (i.e. they have had a preceding record of success and/or internal solidarity).
     
  Yet result 1. is not identical with stating that each VP-state would induce war. To account for all details of the causal nexus to war, two additional issues have to be considered:
  
  1. Research in this field must not omit the second possible main form of fatal victimization: that by famine (and/or epidemics) -- with an annual global mortality rate of almost three times the average annual toll of fatal victims in World War II. Both of these main forms of fatal victimization have two peculiarities in common: The (preceding) VP-state and the disproportionately high death toll of the lower social strata.
     
     The probability for war is greater in nations strongly armed and not too much in poverty (as e.g. the last Iraqi/Iranian war); while it is greater for famine (and/or epidemics) in nations stricken with poverty (as e.g. Sudan and Mozambique -- inflicted with civil war).
     
  2. The question may arise why at all nations in a VI-state would become involved in war (except for the successfully neutral ones). The apparent paradox solves under the following aspects:
     • The percentage of war casualties of nations in a VI-state is much lower than that of nations in a VP-state.
     • This percentage, in turn, mainly involved the lower social strata of such a nation.
     • In some cases, nations were involved the VI-state of which was not very pronounced in comparison.
  
  
  
  Figure 2:  War or famine become latent (dashed arrows) after a
  VP-state (long-term interrelation symbolized by solid arrows).
  
  
  For further substantiation of the causal nexus to war, the empirically confirmed "how" should be supplemented by more subtly discussing the "why" -- mainly on a psychological basis within or beyond the victimological aspect.
  
  
  1. By its definition as long lasting, a U-state (other than a shortlived U case) cannot be interpreted as "accidental"; its endurance rather reveals VP-traits: A listless attitude and/or the inability to solve grave problems before they become chronic and/or escalate. On the other hand, the duration of a decade suffices to make these traits manifest.
     
  2. The persistence of the U-state would entail a decrease in prestige and psychic identity. [5, 6] This further narrows the psychological reserve, as e.g. the patience necessary to cope with short term "test provocations" (crises, "tensions").
     
  3. If war is waged, it is often for impatiently hoping to make good for hitherto unsuccessful developments, by gains in war. If a lost war was the dominating U event, discontent and a desire for recovery can be superimposed by resentments and vindictiveness, which signal VP components in (re)action.
     
  4. In an extreme U-state, an attitude of having little to lose any more may dominate, with the lower (VP) strata especially suggestible to radical hostile agitation (political, chauvinistic, religious).
     
  5. The loser of a war is usually denounced as evil, untrustworthy, crude, cruel etc. Analogously, the U-state of a nation arouses an (only less pronounced) antipathy in potential adversaries.
     
  6. Analogous to interpersonal relations, a U-state results in losing potential allies; whereas VI characteristics tend to win allies, which can contribute to winning war.
  
  
  

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  6. Relevant peace issues under the victimological aspect -- example Europe

  In contrast to the situation preceding World War II, the present peace era in western Europe bases on

  1. its joint success in economic and technical fields (as compared both to the past and to the global situation), achieved with
     
  2. its improved solidarity (especially within EC), interrelated to 1.

  Continuation of peace in Europe will depend on its continued success and internal solidarity -- including e.g. a reduction of the jobless rate and of environmental pollution.

  Analysed under the victimological aspect, still "latent" defence issues have to be questioned:
  

  A nuclear war would refute victimological principles as it would also harm the potential victor, neutral nations and all of their social strata. This logic hence "forbids" an occurrence of that kind of a total war (and would be adopted by motivation due to the victimological principle which works in interpersonal and in intergroup relations).

  However, this logic doesn't exclude the application of the "smaller" thermonuclear shells, knapsack mines or neutron bombs which facilitate "aimed" extermination of combattants and neighboured civilian population. Since these bombs trigger relatively small shock-waves, the local VI strata would be capable to protect against exposition (by safe private shelters, or by emigration to presumably safe areas/countries).
  

  This virtual connection has to be kept in mind to see that future disarmament negotiations abolish this sort of arms.
  

  Another dead-end layout for security is the "pure" defence doctrine (culminating in the SDI concept). Like unsuccessful defence devices before -- Chinese Wall, Roman Limes, French Maginot Line etc., -- it can only simulate a long-term security to the domestic population, while it stimulates the enemies' inventive phantasy to outmanoeuvre the presumed patent solution by some modern version of the "Trojan Horse".
  

  The victimological approach can lastingly contribute to war prevention only with a concept not limited to temporal, geographical or arms categories. This concept bases on a thorough rethinking, based on a general knowledge and consciousness and conviction of the causal nexi.
  

  Recommendations how to prevent becoming a victim, as found in literature on interpersonal victimology, would hardly suffice in case of emergency. It is advised -- generalized and by examples -- to avoid victimogenic behaviour and situations.[1,3] Like any behavioural patent solution offered, this concept can improve the awareness of the issue; beyond that it only shifts the problem from learning and resolving (to behave along the right principles), to their successful application. If e.g. courage could be practised along the guidance of a recipe guaranteeing success, it would cease to imply risks; and thereby cease to be courage.

  Wherever started, the process of learning, awareness and due behaviour takes much longer at the level of nations than at (inter)personal level, but is finally successful. The history of recent centuries holds examples of final success of rethinking:

  • The replacement both of ecclesiastical power and general superstition by Enlightenment has overcome imputed witchcraft and its unspeakably cruel persecution, which had terrorrized Europe for more than three centuries.
    
    
  • Until a century ago, the declaration of "private war" by challenging to fight an (often fatal) armed duel was handled as a mere pecadillo. Since the common attitudes towards prestige, morals and justice have altered, this kind of victimization has also been overcome.
    
    
  • The abolition of slavery represents a similar example.
    
  Another shove of general enlightenment should involve a thorough research on psycho-social connections (of which victimological principles are only an integrated part).

  Results of this research should be brought to general awareness; an "immunizing" effect can also be achieved by going on to documentate past wars on TV. This may prepare the soil for a decisive step towards the abolition of the plaque of wars -- the abolition of all of the military, which now, very slowly though, enters the scope of the conceivable.
  
  
  
  
  

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  References

  [1]	Jörg Schuh, "Viktimologie -- der fatale Zusammenhang zwischen Widerstand und Anpassung", in Walter Häsler, Viktimologie (Grüsch, Switzerland: Rüegger, 1986). Back to the text reference
  [2]	Hans-Joachim Schneider, Das Verbrechensopfer in der Strafrechtspflege, omnibus volume, 3rd Internat. Sympos. on Victimology in Münster, Germany, 447 pp. (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1982). Back to the text reference
  [3]	Terence P. Thornberry, Simon I. Singer, "Opfer und Täter: Zur Übereinstimmung zweier Populationen", in Gerd F. Kirchhoff, Klaus Sessar, Das Verbrechensopfer (Bochum: N. Brockmeyer, 1979). Back to the text reference
  [4]	Walter Kiefl, Sigfried Lamneck, Soziologie des Opfers (Munich: W. Fink, 1986). Back to the text reference
  [5]	P. H. Johnson et al., The recidivist victim (Huntsville, Texas, 1973; cited in: Gerd F. Kirchhoff, Klaus Sessar, Das Verbrechensopfer, Bochum: N. Brockmeyer, 1979). Back to the text reference
  [6]	Dominik Prodöhl, Joachim Reuss, "Zur Psychologie interpersonaler und internationaler Konflikte", Gestalt Theory (Vol. 4, No. 1/2, 1982, 72-78).